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This article is addressed to attorneys with a general practice, as
well as those familiar with the creditors' rights area. Its purpose is
to alert the non-specialist to developments of the last two
years-April 1986 through April 1988. Virginia cases dealing with
collection matters and federal bankruptcy decisions are reviewed.
Legislation enacted over the past two years is also noted.
With the exception of the United Savings Association v. Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.1 decision involving under-
secured creditors, neither the cases nor legislation appear seminal.
Therefore, the reader should expect a survey of recent events and
not an in-depth study. This article states the new decisions or leg-
islation, indicates some of their ramifications, and in some in-
stances suggests how they relate to other areas of creditors' rights.
I. GARNISHMENT
In Virginia, garnishment is a post-judgment proceeding to aid
execution.2 The issuance of a writ of fieri facias (execution) creates
a lien on the debtor's intangible property' (property not subject to
levy). The lien also authorizes a sheriff to levy on the debtor's tan-
gible personal property within his bailiwick.4 Garnishment is the
primary method of enforcing the lien on intangibles. The judgment
creditor, upon suggestion, institutes garnishment proceedings to
enforce the lien of fieri facias on debts and chattels in the posses-
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; B.A., 1959, Washington and Lee
University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Douglas R. Harris, a sec-
ond-year law student at Washington and Lee University.
The author also thanks his colleague, Lyman Johnson, for his helpful comments on Sec-
tion I11.
1. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 115-128.
2. See generally T. BOYD, E. GRAVES & L. MIDDLEDITCH, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.6
(1982 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter BOYD, GRAVES]; D. RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA §§ 3.1-3.10 (1982 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter RENDLEMAN].
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-501 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
4. Id. § 8.01-478; see also id. § 8.01-458 (judgment lien against real estate); id. § 8.01-501
to -505 (property not capable of levy).
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sion of a third person.5 The suggestion must be served on the gar-
nishee, and then on the judgment debtor.6 The garnishee must an-
swer on or before the return date, and indicate the amount of
indebtedness or the property held to which the judgment debtor is
entitled. Disputes over the amount of the debt will be resolved by
the court.8
The scope of assets subject to garnishment was uncertain until
the decision in Virginia National Bank v. Blofeld.9 Prior to
Blofeld, there was no decision stating whether garnishment im-
pounds indebtedness or chattels in the garnishee's possession as of
the date of service or whether it impounds indebtedness or chattels
of the debtor coming into the garnishee's possession after service
but before the return date. The court, interpreting sections 8.01-
501, 8.01-511 and 8.01-512.3 of the Code of Virginia,10 held that the
lien covers all obligations owed, including property received by the
garnishee before the return date stated on the writ.1 Thus, the
garnishee must include in the return the amount of property held
as of that date. 2 Payment of an indebtedness to the debtor before
the return date of an obligation which arose after service of the
summons does not discharge the garnishee's liability."
To discharge the obligations, the garnishee may pay the amount
of his liability to the court at anytime before the return date.'4 It is
unclear whether the garnishee can avoid the Blofeld rule by imme-
diately denying liability and returning the summons.
5. The suggestion commences the garnishment proceeding. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511
(Cum. Supp. 1988). "In Virginia, until fairly recent times, it was the accepted practice to
make the suggestion orally before the clerk." BOYD, GRAVES, supra note 2, § 13.6, at n.44.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511.
7. Id. § 8.01-514 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
8. Id. §§ 8.01-515, -519; see RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, § 3.5(A).
9. 234 Va. 395, 362 S.E.2d 692 (1987).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-501 (Repl. Vol. 1984) provides that a writ of fieri facias creates
a lien on the debtor's personal estate "to which the judgment debtor is, or may afterwards
and on or before the return day of such writ become, possessed or entitled." Sections 8.01-
511 and 8.01-512.3 (Repl. Vol. 1984) contain similar language.
11. Blofeld, 234 Va. at 399, 362 S.E.2d at 695.
12. Id. at 400, 362 S.E.2d at 695.
13. In Blofeld, the indebtedness arose from a court decree entered three days after ser-
vice of the summons on the garnishee. The garnishee paid the debt to the judgment debtor
and his assignee. Because the lien covered the indebtedness, the garnishee had to pay again.
Id.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-520 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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Two circuit courts have considered the related issue of what
debts may be garnished. In Tipco Homes, Inc. v. Woods,15 the
court held that funds which the judgment debtor may earn in the
future, but are not yet due, may not be garnished. 6 In terms of the
Blofeld decision, if the debt remains contingent upon the debtor's
performance on the return date, the garnishee may properly deny
liability. Of course, if the debtor does perform, garnishment would
then be proper. In Broyhill v. Boyer Companies, Ltd.,17 the court
held that funds deposited with county officials by the debtor to
assure performance of a construction contract may not be gar-
nished by a private party who was not an intended beneficiary of
the deposit.18
Garnishment establishes the liability of the garnishee to the
judgment creditor but does not necessarily determine the judg-
ment creditor's priority to the debt or chattel. In McEwen Lumber
Co. v. Lipscomb Brothers Lumber Co.,"9 a creditor recovered a de-
fault judgment against the garnishee. The garnishee moved to va-
cate the judgment on the ground that the judgment creditor did
not have priority to the garnished indebtedness.20 The circuit court
vacated the default judgment, but the Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the garnishee had failed to establish any stat-
utory ground to upset the default judgment.2 ' The supreme court
emphasized that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
competing priority claims because such claimants were not parties
to the garnishment.22 Thus, the judgment creditor regained its
judgment, but priority to the indebtedness remained unresolved.
The judgment creditor could have resolved this issue by joining the
adverse claimants in the original garnishment.23
15. 9 Va. Cir. 95 (Fairfax County 1987).
16. Id. at 95.
17. 9 Va. Cir. 550 (Fairfax County 1984). Broyhill, like Tipco Homes, appears to be a
premature garnishment. See supra note 15.
18. Id. at 550.
19. 234 Va. 243, 360 S.E.2d 845 (1987).
20. Id. at 246, 360 S.E.2d at 847. The adverse claimants to the fund presented arguments
on the motion to vacate even though they had not been joined as parties in the original
garnishment proceeding. Id. at 246-47, 360 S.E.2d at 847-48; cf. supra text accompanying
notes 7 & 8.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984) provides that a default or consent
judgment may be set aside for fraud on the court, a void judgment or proof of an accord and
satisfaction. See McEwen, 234 Va. 243, 360 S.E.2d 845, for a discussion of a void judgment
and proof of an accord and satisfaction.
22. 234 Va. at 247, 360 S.E.2d at 847.
23. Id.
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Lewis v. House2 4 almost settled the important question of
whether a creditor may garnish a joint bank account. Plaintiff gar-
nished the joint bank account of debtor and his wife. The debtor
conceded that the plaintiff could reach the funds through garnish-
ment.25 The sole issue was whether the wife owned one-half of the
funds, absent evidence as to their source.26 The case turned on the
construction of section 6.1-125.3 of the Virginia Multiple-Party Ac-
count Act which provides:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetimes of all parties, to the
parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums
on deposit, except that a joint account between persons married to
each other shall belong to them equally, and unless, in either case,
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.21
The court read the statute as a legislative direction to treat hus-
band and wife depositors more favorably than other joint deposi-
tors.2" The non-debtor spouse gets one-half of the account as
against creditors, unless the creditor proves the spouse's contribu-
tion was less. 29 Because the creditor in Lewis offered no evidence
on the source of funds, the statutory presumption mandated one-
half to the wife.30
The Lewis court did not answer the question of whether a judg-
ment creditor can garnish a multiple-party account. The answer,
however, must be "yes." The Multiple-Party Account Act was
enacted to resolve a number of issues relating to multiple-party
accounts,"' including the right of creditors against such
24. 232 Va. 28, 348 S.E.2d 217 (1986).
25. Id. at 29, 348 S.E.2d at 218.
26. Id. at 30, 348 S.E.2d at 218-19.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3 (Repl. Vol. 1988). This section is part of the Virginia Mul-
tiple-Party Account Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16.
28. Lewis, 232 Va. at 31, 348 S.E.2d at 219. This liberal policy influenced a bankruptcy
court decision involving an exemption claim of a spouse. See infra notes 62-64 and accom-
panying text.
29. Id.
30. Id. Presumably, the wife could prove that the entire account belonged to her. Cf.
Fleming v. Bank of Va., 231 Va. 299, 343 S.E.2d 341 (1986) (bank could not set-off deposit
against debt owed it if evidence is clear that non-debtor depositor placed all funds in
account).
31. See generally Note, Multiple-Party Accounts: Does Virginia's New Law Correspond
with the Expectations of the Average Depositor?, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 851 (1980). The most
litigated issue about multi-party accounts concerned the question of how to treat the ac-
count when a depositor died. Section 6.1-125.3 reverses the common law rule and provides
that the funds go to the other parties to the account absent evidence of a contrary intent.
[Vol. 22:517
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accounts.3 2 Section 6.1-125.3 establishes the ownership rights of all
claimants to the funds.3 Given that a creditor is entitled to use all
of the debtor's non-exempt funds to satisfy a claim, the garnishing
creditor is entitled to use whatever portion of the account the
debtor-depositor owned.3 4 Section 6.1-125.3 provides that absent
proof of contributions to the fund, the garnishing creditor is enti-
tled to use one-half of an account in the name of spouses, 5 and the
entire account in all other cases. The latter presumption is
founded on the idea that the party with the best access to the nec-
essary information has the duty of going forward with the
evidence."
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
A. Voluntary Conveyance Section 55-81 Amended
The voluntary conveyance statute has been amended.37 Old sec-
tion 55-81 of the Code of Virginia voided all gifts, (transfers with-
out consideration), by an indebted person at the suit of creditors
with liquidated claims" brought within five years of the transfer.3 9
The solvency and good faith of the debtor were irrelevant. 0
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.2; see also RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, § 3.7.
33. The fact that either party may withdraw the entire account has no bearing on owner-
ship rights. Lewis, 232 Va. at 30-31, 348 S.E.2d at 219 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
125.3).
34. This Virginia rule applies only to accounts held by spouses. The Multiple-Party Ac-
count Act assumes that garnishment is appropriate. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3(D)
(Repl. Vol. 1988) (rules stipulating notice to customers and fees financial institutions may
charge when a multiple account is garnished).
35. This assumes that the spouses have not specifically stated that they hold the account
as tenants by the entirety, overcoming the presumption in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-20, -21
(Repl. Vol. 1986) that conveyances to husband and wife create a tenancy in common. Per-
sonal property may be held by spouses in this manner. Oliver v. Givens, 204 Va. 123, 129
S.E.2d 661 (1963) (citing Moore v. Glotzbach, 188 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1960)). If the
account is held by the spouses as tenants by the entireties, it is immune from the claims of
all but joint creditors of husband and wife. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d
599, 602 (1951). If the account is not held in this form, the debtor spouse may claim it as
exempt. Lewis, 232 Va. at 29, 348 S.E.2d at 218.
36. See, e.g., Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 354, 381 S.W.2d 752, 754 (1964) (entire
account subject to garnishment, with burden on depositors to show actual ownership
interests).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
38. Id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 1986). A tort creditor is not liquid until the cause of action is
reduced to judgment. See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & PREFERENCES § 317 (rev.
ed. 1940) [hereinafter GLENN].
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-253 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
40. See, e.g., Morriss v. Bronson, 170 Va. 516, 197 S.E. 479 (1938) (shows the harsh
results when the statute was applied); see infra note 45.
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The 1988 amendment brings section 55-81 more in line with sim-
ilar legislation, such as section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act (Uniform Act).41 The amendment provides that every
gift "by an insolvent transferor, or by a transferor who is thereby
rendered insolvent"'42 may be voided by present creditors. The
plaintiff must prove three elements to state a claim under the
amendment: 1) the challenged transfer was a gift;'3 2) the debtor
was either insolvent when the transfer was made or rendered insol-
vent by it; and 3) the creditor held a liquidated claim against the
debtor when the transfer occurred." The second element is new.
This change seems quite sensible, because not every gift injures
creditors.45 As long as the debtor retains assets sufficient to pay
creditors, creditors have no grievance. Only those gifts which
render the debtor unable to pay current obligations harm credi-
tors.'6 Merely because the debtor once owned the property does
not mean that the creditor ought to be able to satisfy claims from
it.4  Nonetheless, original section 55-81 required this result.
In contrast, where the gift leaves the debtor insufficient property
to pay all debts, the creditor's complaint is apparent. The debtor's
intent to hinder, delay, and defraud in such a transaction is pre-
sumed in law, based on the principle that one contemplates the
41. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("Uniform Act") provides that "[e]very
conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby ren-
dered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the con-
veyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918) (emphasis added) [hereinafter UNI-
FORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT].
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
43. Presumably, if the consideration is merely inadequate, § 55-81 does not apply, and
the creditor must prove fraud under § 55-80. Cf. supra note 41. "Fair consideration" is
defined in section 3 of the Uniform Act as an exchange of property of reasonably equivalent
value or satisfaction of an antecedent debt. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, supra
note 41, § 3.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81.
45. Lord Hardwicke expressed the idea underlying original § 55-81: "A man actually in-
debted, and conveying voluntarily, always means to be in fraud of creditors." Townshend v.
Windham, 28 Eng. Rep. 1, 7 (Ch. 1750). How this concept became the Virginia rule is set
forth in GLENN, supra note 38, §§ 268-268(a).
46. Whether a disclaimer of legacies, devises or inheritances constitutes a fraudulent
conveyance has caused judicial disagreement. A disclaimer is a species of gift and arguably
within the ambit of § 55-81. Disclaimers are governed by VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-190 to -196
(Repl. Vol. 1987), which permits an indebted beneficiary to disclaim legacies, etc. and de-
prive creditors of these assets. Niklason v. Ramsey, 233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987),
demonstrates how astute courts have been in finding such disclaimers ineffective as to
creditors.
47. See infra note 54.
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necessary consequences of one's own acts.48 Amended section 55-81
applies only in this latter situation.
The debtor's insolvency can be proven by records or through evi-
dentiary presumptions from case law. The solvency question turns
on valuation of assets and liabilities when sufficient records are
available. When the debtor's records are incomplete, creditors
should be assisted by the evidentiary presumptions developed in
cases decided under section 4 of the Uniform Act. For example, if a
present creditor proves that the transfer was without considera-
tion, the burden of proof will shift to the debtor-defendants to
demonstrate the transferor's solvency.49
B. Intra-Corporate Manipulations and the Fraudulent Convey-
ance Laws
The Virginia Supreme Court, like its counterparts, attempts to
develop a coherent scheme for each area of the law. One of its
functions is to state rules that make sense and can be easily ad-
ministered. Ease of administration is often the decisive factor in
choosing how to resolve a particular case.5 0 Every so often, how-
ever, a court will decide a case in order to get a "good" result, and
this decision becomes a stumbling block for future development.
Using such perspective one can best understand the recent deci-
sion in Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co.5 1
In Cheatle, a debtor corporation transferred all of its assets to a
new corporation that had been reorganized for the purpose of oper-
ating the transferor's business. When Supply was unable to collect
a judgment against the debtor, it sued to set aside the transfer as a
fraudulent conveyance and pierce the corporate veil against
Cheatle, a director of the debtor. Cheatle owned one-half of the
stock in the debtor and one-third in the new corporation, and her
husband served as a director of each. The trial judge upset the
transfer to the new corporation as a fraudulent conveyance, and
awarded Supply a personal judgment against Cheatle for compen-
48. See GLENN, supra note 38, § 74.
49. See, e.g., United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del. 1969); Cohen v. Benjamin,
246 App. Div. 866, 284 N.Y.S. 884 (1936) (voluntary transferror has burden of proof on
questions of solvency).
50. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1035-45
(1928).
51. 234 Va. 207, 360 S.E.2d 828 (1987).
19881
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satory and punitive damages.52 The supreme court reversed, hold-
ing that "§ 55-80 does not authorize an in personam judgment
when a fraudulent conveyance is set aside. ' 53 Subject to some well
recognized exceptions,54 plaintiff's remedy is to set aside the trans-
fer and sell the property. The court also found "the evidence...
utterly insufficient to warrant casting aside the corporate entity. '5
The decision seems so clear cut that one wonders how the trial
court could have been mistaken.
The trial judge in Cheatle relied on the Fourth Circuit decision
in National Carloading Corp. v. Astro Van Lines,56 a case present-
ing facts similar to but not identical with Cheatle. In National
Carloading, the individual defendant, Sills, purchased an insolvent
corporation and then caused the insolvent to transfer the insol-
vent's sole asset to another corporation owned by Sills, which im-
mediately commenced operating the transferor's business. After
the transfer Sills paid off an encumbrance on the transferred asset.
General creditors of the insolvent then attacked the transfer, nam-
ing the transferee and Sills as defendants. The district judge char-
acterized the facts as a fraudulent scheme to obtain the use of the
transferred asset free from the claims of the insolvent's creditors.
Creditors were permitted to pierce the corporate veil and hold Sills
52. Id. at 211, 360 S.E.2d at 830.
53. Id. at 212, 360 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting Mills v. Miller Harness Co., 229 Va. 155, 158,
326 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1985)).
54. If the grantee no longer owns the property but has transferred it to another, the
grantee's liability is limited to the present value of the property. For a discussion of the
Virginia remedy and its difference from other states, see generally supra note 38, § 125.
There are two exceptions to the general rule. First, where the transferee acts in bad faith,
additional damages are measured by the use of the property in order that the plaintiff may
receive complete relief. See e.g., Tcherepnin v. Franz, 489 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Miller v. Kaiser, 164 Colo. 206, 433 P.2d 772 (1967). Second, the limitation on personal
liability does not protect the grantee if the fraudulent transfer occurred post judgment.
Glenn, supra note 38, § 74, explains the rationale for this second exception:
The reason why there is no tort cause of action for a fraudulent transfer that takes
place before the creditor obtains judgment or attaches is that a general creditor has
no property interest in his debtor's assets, and so the result of the transfer is the loss
of a mere possibility of realization which is too speculative to be measured in dam-
ages. But, an exception which proves the rule, is made when the transfer takes place
after the aggrieved creditor has obtained a judgment, or procured a warrant of at-
tachment. We then have a 'rescue,' to the injury of a man who, by judgment or at-
tachment, has acquired the rights to the subject the debtor asserts to his claims; and
so in that case an action lies.
55. Cheatle, 234 Va. at 213, 360 S.E.2d at 831. The court emphasized that Cheatle had
not benefited in the transaction, and that the transfer was a part of a reorganization in
which a third party had contributed new capital. Id.
56. 593 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1979).
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personally liable to the extent of their debts.5" The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, but relied on fraudulent conveyance concepts rather than
accepting the trial court's rationale.58 To Sills' defense that he
(and his corporation) qualified as a bona fide purchaser by paying
off a prior lien, the Fourth Circuit responded that the defendants
knew that the transfer would hinder and delay the insolvent's
creditors, and such guilty knowledge precluded the defendants
from qualifying as bona fide purchasers.5 9 The court justified the
personal judgment against Sills by analyzing the transaction to a
de facto merger of the seller and buyer."0
National Carloading need be examined in some detail to appre-
ciate Cheatle. To start, note that the plaintiff creditors did well
indeed. Before the sale of the insolvent corporation to Sills, un-
secured creditors could have obtained only the equity of the en-
cumbered asset, if any existed. 1 After Sills purchased the insol-
vent's stock, but before the transfer of the assets to Sills' new
corporation, creditors could have gotten no more. If Sills' conduct
had not been characterized as fraudulent, the most creditors could
have received is the value of the asset or the consideration paid for
it after the prior lien had been satisfied. The finding of fraud, how-
ever, permitted an award in excess of the amount general creditors
could ordinarily expect. Characterizing the transaction as a con-
veyance made with actual fraudulent intent was crucial. Sills pur-
chased the insolvent, transferred its primary asset to another of his
corporations, and paid off a lien on the asset. The Fourth Circuit
stated that "the obvious and inevitable effect of the transaction
was to delay and hinder the plaintiffs in collecting their debts. Be-
cause of their position, the defendants are chargeable with that
intent." 2 To support this approach the court cited Darden v.
George C. Lee Co.,6" which held that directors in charge of an in-
57. Id. at 562.
58. Id. at 562-64. The district court opinion was not reported. In addition to the facts set
out in the text, the district court relied on Sills' sale of other assets of the insolvent for
$80,000, and his attempt to conceal that the asset was transferred to one of Sills' corpora-
tions. The district court judge apparently relied on these matters to support his characteri-
zation, but the Fourth Circuit's holding did not depend on them.
59. Id. at 564.
60. Id.
61. The Fourth Circuit carefully refrained from stating whether any equity existed.
62. National Carloading, 593 F.2d at 562 (emphasis added). That is, because Sills acted
on both sides of the transaction, Sills knew that the insolvent's creditors would be adversely
affected by the transfer.
63. 204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1963).
1988]
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solvent corporation commit a per se fraudulent conveyance by
"grant[ing] .. .a preference or an advantage [to themselves] over
other creditors in the payment of their claims."64 According to the
Darden court the evil intent inherent in such a preference, unlike
others, is that it hindered and delayed creditors, and the transferee
necessarily knew such hindering would ensue.
The statement of the Darden rationale marks it as questionable
on its face. Outside of bankruptcy, preferences are permissible.
Preferences necessarily hinder other creditors because such assets
can no longer be used to satisfy debts. Yet, all authorities agree
that payment of an antecedent debt is sufficient consideration to
protect the recipient as a bona fide purchaser." The fact that the
recipient knows of the preference does not forfeit his status: no
wrong is committed by accepting a preference. The Darden court
never explains how the director's intent differed from that of the
run of the mill preferee6 What intent beyond payment of the debt
owed did the director have? The Darden court was offended by the
director's use of position to gain an "advantage" over other general
creditors, but such a rationale does not sustain a holding that the
preference to the director was a fraudulent conveyance. Indeed,
Darden has confused the law in this area. 7
64. Id. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 900 (1963) (emphasis added). The precise facts of Darden
are worth stating. The insolvent corporation, Ricks Company, worked out a Chapter 11 ar-
rangement (a composition) in Bankruptcy. Darden put up $22,500 to fund the arrangement.
As consideration for his advance, Darden took Ricks notes and received 50% of the common
stock of Ricks. He subsequently became Ricks controlling director. Id. at 109, 129 S.E.2d at
898. The Darden case was tried on the theory that Darden was a creditor, and the issue was
whether the preference should be characterized as a fraudulent conveyance under § 55-80.
Id. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 899-900.
Arguably, Darden was tried under the wrong theory. Darden's $22,500 should have been
viewed as a contribution to capital rather than a loan. Darden made an investment in Ricks
Company, buying a 50% interest. The notes were window dressing, an attempt to disguise
Darden's status if the company failed. As an investor, Darden's right to corporate assets is
inferior to that of general creditors, and creditors should have been entitled to all of the
funds recovered from Darden. Instead, Darden used the notes to convince the court of his
creditor status and shared in this fund pro rata with other creditors.
65. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, supra note 41, § 3. Upholding prefer-
ences against a fraudulent challenge is justified on two other grounds not mentioned in the
text. First, until creditors obtain a lien on an, asset, creditors have no interest in it, and the
debtor, as owner, may use it as he pleases. This is in the traditional justification. See BUMP,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 179 (3rd ed. 1882); GLENN, supra note 38, § 74. Second, if a pref-
erence could be upset as a fraudulent conveyance, "there would be a substitution of one
preference by another." Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 402, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (1963).
66. This point is considered at length in Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances and Prefer-
ence in Virginia, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51 (1979).
67. Plaintiff in Darden relied on § 55-80 to upset the transfer. To sustain the judgment
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National Carloading follows Darden, flaws and all. Neither
court approved of the corporate manipulations. Both thought the
plaintiff creditors were entitled to relief. Like Darden, the Fourth
Circuit relied on Sills' complete knowledge of the transaction to
deny him good faith purchaser status without specifying the fraud
itself."8 As in Darden, the murky law of fraudulent conveyances
allowed the Fourth Circuit to avoid explaining why this transac-
tion is offensive.
National Carloading sticks out like a sore thumb in Fourth Cir-
cuit jurisprudence. No court has done more to develop a body of
law for dealing with insider preferences. Ever since Certain-Teed
v. Wallinger69 the Fourth Circuit has recognized that cases like
Darden and National Carloading present issues crucially different
from run of the mill preferential payments.70 Such cases were
viewed as attempts by the owners of failing businesses to gain an
advantage over general creditors through insider maneuvers. In
Certain-Teed and its progeny the Fourth Circuit began the diffi-
cult task of creating a theory of duties toward outside corporate
creditors. The National Carloading panel must have assumed,
however, that Virginia had rejected the Certain-Teed line of cases
which precluded it from continuing the development.
Why didn't the Fourth Circuit rely on the District Court's posi-
tion? Consideration concerning the remedy appear to have been
crucial. Piercing the corporate veil apparently would have been
below, the court was bound by its Rules of Court to consider only theories presented at trial.
See VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:2. To obtain a good result the court stretched fraudulent conveyance
concepts. Darden well illustrates the old saying, "the road to hell is paved with good
intentions."
68. The Darden approach limits liability in certain cases. Under § 55-80, a bona fide
purchaser retains the property despite his transferor's evil intent. The Virginia court em-
ployed this rule to protect controlling directors of an insolvent in a transaction functionally
similar to Darden. In Bank of Commerce v. Rosemary & Thyme, 218 Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d
909 (1978), the issue was whether preferential payments made by a corporation to a third
party on debts for which the directors were sureties fell within the scope of Darden. The
court held that since the party receiving the preference qualified as a bona fide purchaser,
the transaction could not be set aside under § 55-80 even though the directors possessed
guilty knowledge and gained an advantage. Id. at 789, 239 S.E.2d at 915; cf. Regal Ware,
Inc. v. Fidelity Corp., 550 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629 (4th Cir.
1945). On facts essentially identical to Bank of Commerce, these Fourth Circuit cases held
that the creditor could recover the preference.
69. 89 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1937).
70. See the Fourth Circuit cases cited supra note 67. Ironically, Certain-Teed appears to
be the basis for the Darden decision but is ignored in Bank of Commerce.
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permissible under Virginia law."' Yet, approaching the case under
this theory might have forced the court to consider the extent of
the creditors recovery. How did Sills' manipulations harm these
creditors? The manipulation deprived creditors of immediate ac-
cess to the asset. Yet, as noted above, the asset may not have been
of any value to creditors because it was encumbered by a prior lien.
On the other hand, if the transfer involved actual fraud, the focus
shifts to Sills' evil intent, and the actual value of the asset to credi-
tors before the transfer is more easily ignored. Manipulating doc-
trine allowed the court to increase the creditors' recovery through
the guise of finding Sills a party to the fraud, a result which de-
mands that Sills be given no credit for paying off the prior lien and
permits the award of a personal judgment for the value of the
asset.72
With this background in mind, one can see why the Cheatle
court distinguished National Carloading. Using Darden as the
touchstone, the cases are quite different. The Cheatles, unlike Sills,
were not transferees, and therefore the fraudulent conveyance laws
provided no remedy.7 s To win, plaintiff needed to demonstrate an-
other theory. Plaintiffs failed to establish a ground to pierce the
corporate veil. While Sills used the corporation as a device to dis-
guise a wrong or obscure a fraud, Supply failed to show that the
Cheatles engaged in similar activity. 4
Given that the Cheatle result is correct, the opinion is disap-
pointing. Cheatle offered the opportunity to correct the misimpres-
71. To pierce the corporate veil, "the plaintiff must show that the corporate entity was
the alter ego, alias, stooge, or dummy of the individuals sought to be charged personally and
the corporation was a device or sham used to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal
crime." Cheatle, 234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting Lewe's Trucking Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, 207 Va. 23, 31, 147 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1966)). Whether this theory would have
been proper in National Carloading seems questionable. Such a holding would convert Sills
into a surety for the insolvent's general creditors, a right not bargained. Cf. Cheatle, 234 Va.
at 214, 360 S.E.2d at 832 (the court explains why a count sounding in deceit cannot be
sustained).
72. The Fourth Circuit also affirmed a punitive damages award. Sills' fraud apparently
merited a double recovery. Thus, Sills comes out far worse than Darden, although his sins
may have been no worse. Cf. supra note 63.
73. This is true even if one assumes the Cheatles acted wrongfully and benefitted from
the transfer. See supra note 67.
74. Cheatle, 234 Va. at 209, 360 S.E.2d at 830, asserts that the Fourth Circuit reached its
result in National Carloading by "apparently pierc[ing] the corporate veil," despite its pro-
tests to the contrary. The Virginia court seems to imply that National Carloading could be
sustained on such theory.
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sions created by Darden.5 Preferences by an insolvent corporation
to or for the benefit of insiders present complicated issues different
from standard preference situations.76 As yet, there is no consensus
on how these transactions ought to be treated outside bank-
ruptcy.7" It does seem clear, however, that fraudulent conveyance
law should not be the primary remedy for corporate manipulations
by insiders. Yet, both the lower court decision in Cheatle and the
Fourth Circuit decision in National Carloading suggest that the
Bench and the Bar in Virginia so regard it. Vague notions of legal
fraud based on a presumed subjective intent divert attention from
the issue of whether the conduct ought to be condemned. Both of
these courts focused on the controlling directors' position on both
sides of the transfer, and for this reason gave judgment against
Darden and Sills. The real question, whether the transfers should
be condemned, was not addressed. 8 Cheatle says only that Darden
does not apply because the Cheatles were not transferees.
Possibly, this reads Cheatle too narrowly. The court does point
out that despite their presumed knowledge the defendants did no
wrong. This should tell trial judges that status on both sides of a
transaction is insufficient, standing alone, to award a personal
judgment. The court's explicit consideration of piercing the corpo-
rate veil implies that other theories are applicable. One could read
Cheatle as suggesting that National Carloading was correctly de-
cided under this theory. Read this way, Darden designates one sit-
uation in which insider preferences violate the law every time, and
the court will consider related situations as they arise.79
Even if this latter reading of Cheatle is correct, the court should
have gone further. Acceptance of the Fourth Circuit position
stated in Certain-Teed would have been preferable. Given the con-
fusion created by Darden, one has to assume the court's next op-
portunity to reexamine this area will soon arise.
75. The court recently reaffirmed Darden in Mills v. Miller Harness Co., 229 Va. 155,
326 S.E.2d 665 (1985), including the remedy.
76. See generally 1 Glenn, note 38, supra §§ 386-388.
77. Section 547(b)(4) voids all transfers by insiders made within one year. The maneu-
vering by insiders found in Darden, National Carloading or the cases in note 67 represent
just three forms of "bankruptcy planning." See Lopucki, A General Theory of the Dynam-
ics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 333-43.
78. What did Sills do wrong? Assuming he stood ready to pay general creditors of the
insolvent the equity of the transferred asset, what complaint did they have? If Sills tried to
conceal the transfer, such fraud merits punitive damages as a deterrent; whether Sills ought
to be held liable for the value of the asset is unclear. Cf. supra note 71.
79. As noted above, the remedy for such activity should be reconsidered as well.
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III. EXEMPTIONS
The Virginia Supreme Court seldom decides cases dealing with
exemption issues. Bankruptcy courts, on the other hand, decide ex-
emption questions constantly. The Bankruptcy Code"0 provides
the most important application of the Virginia exemption system.
All individual debtors will claim exemptions, but the Virginia ex-
emptions are the only ones a Virginia bankrupt may claim.8 Bank-
ruptcy planning often involves pushing exemption claims to the
limit. For these reasons, the Virginia exemption system is continu-
ously fashioned in the bankruptcy court.
A bankruptcy exemption may be lost if not claimed according to
state provisions. Virginia law requires a voluntary bankrupt to file
a homestead deed within five days after the first meeting of credi-
tors 2 or lose the exemption. 3 Although the rule is clear, attorneys
occasionally fail to comply. In re Astin holds that the debtor may
not dismiss the case and refile in order to claim the exemption if a
party in interest objects.8 4 Presumably, the trustee, as the repre-
sentative of general creditors, should always object.
In bankruptcy, both husband and wife may claim a homestead
exemption, 5 although only one spouse could do so in a non-bank-
ruptcy setting.88 May the wife claim this exemption in a tax refund
without regard to the extent of her contribution to the income?
According to Bass v. Hall,87 the answer is yes. The bankruptcy
court relied heavily on Virginia's liberal policy regarding exemp-
tions, as well as that particularly favoring spousal claims that
80. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(A) authorizes a state to limit its residents to local exemptions
by "opting out" of the federal exemption. Virginia, along with 39 other states, has opted out.
VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1984). When an involuntary petition is filed, § 34-
17 allows the debtor to set it apart any time before the expiration of the period following
adjudication within which he is required to file his schedules.
83. According to 11 U.S.C. § 2003(a) (Supp. 1982), the first creditors' meeting should
take place not less than 20 or more than 40 days after the petition is filed.
84. 77 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); see In re Wirick, 3 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1980) (debtor may withdraw petition only if "[a]ll creditors were properly noticed and
none objected"). The trustee and creditors are parties in interest. 11 U.S.C. § 1109.
85. Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1981).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (definition of "householder" precludes a hus-
band and wife living together from claiming a double exemption). For more on this anomaly,
see Ulrich, How Bankruptcy Exemptions Work: Virginia As an Illustration of Why the
"Opt Out" Clause Was a Bad Idea, 8 GEo. MASON. L. REV. 1, 8-13 (1985).
87. 79 Bankr. 653 (W.D. Va. 1987).
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homestead."8 Nonetheless, the debtor's claim of homestead cannot
improve his claim of ownership. In Barzee v. Trammel,9 a buyer
placed funds in escrow to be paid to seller only when the seller
discharged liens on the property. The seller could not assert a
homestead superior to the buyer's ownership rights in the fund un-
til the stated conditions were fulfilled.
Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Act permits a debtor to avoid
all judicial liens and "nonpossessory, non-purchase money security
interests" on designated tangible property if such lien impairs an
exemption.90 Suppose a bank perfects a non-purchase money se-
curity interest by filing, and thereafter repossesses before bank-
ruptcy. Assuming that the goods come within the section 522(f)
list, could this be a "nonpossessory" security interest? On these
facts, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
held that a bank's repossession converted its security interest from
nonpossessory to possessory, and therefore section 522(f)(2) was
inapplicable.9' The district court reversed, asserting that the
proper analysis for defining the word "nonpossessory" in section
522(f) turns on how the lien initially attached and how it became
enforceable against the debtor.2 Since the bank's security interest
attached and became enforceable through filing, the security inter-
est should be classified as "nonpossessory."9 3 Such analysis, which
seems correct,94 means that virtually all security interests are
"nonpossessory." Thus, the problem for most debtors using section
522(f)(2) will be providing proof that the property is designated by
section 522(f)(2) for special treatment and that the lien impairs a
Virginia exemption.95
88. Lewis v. House, 232 Va. 28, 348 S.E.2d 217 (1986) (discussed supra notes 24-36)
exemplifies this policy.
89. No. 86-1264 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1987).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
91. In re Meadows, 75 Bankr. 357, 358 (W.D. Va. 1987). The bankruptcy court opinion
was not reported.
92. Id. at 360.
93. Id. at 361. Otherwise, the bank could preclude the use of § 522(f) by repossession
anytime before bankruptcy.
94. The district court's distinction between perfection, which deals with the bank's right
against third parties, and attachment of security interests, which deals with the bank's
rights against the debtor, is in accord with the Code. Compare V&. CODE ANN. § 8.9-201
(Added Vol. 1965) (general validity of security agreement) with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-203
(Curn. Supp. 1988) (attachment and enforceability of security interests). For this reason the
bank's initial agreement and actions control.
95. The debtor lost in Meadows because he could not prove he was engaged in farming
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IV. MECHANIC'S LIENS
A. Waiver of Liens
The Mechanic's Lien Act"6 grants designated parties a right to a
lien on real property to the extent their labor or materials have
improved such property. The statute specifically permits waiver of
this right. 17 Lien waivers have become increasingly common in con-
struction agreements. The importance of lien waivers can be un-
derstood by examining the constantly recurring fact pattern from
which they arise."'
Parties supplying labor or materials to a construction project sel-
dom are paid in advance. Rather, they are paid as the project pro-
gresses ("progress payments"). The project's owner often finances
all or part of the construction through a lender. Progress payments
generally come from the lender. Before the lender advances funds
to the owner for progress payments, lender will demand protection
against mechanics' liens from the owner's title insurance company.
The title insurance company, in turn, will condition its extension
of coverage for such loans upon adequate lien waivers from the
owner. When the owner delivers the required waivers, the title in-
surance company confirms that the requested insurance has been
extended to cover the lender's proposed advance and authorizes
disbursement. Once coverage is confirmed, the lender advances
funds to the owner, who pays the general contractor, who in turn
pays subcontractors and materialmen. The owner and the contrac-
tor anticipate that progress payments cannot occur until the lender
and the title insurance company receive satisfactory lien waivers.
Therefore, most prime contracts deal explicitly with lien waivers
using form lien waivers.
This description sets the stage for consideration of McMerit
Construction Co. v. Knightsbridge Development Co.99 The essen-
tial facts peculiar to McMerit were not in dispute. First, the prime
and entitled to an exemption within the meaning of VA. CODE ANN. § 34-27 (Repl. Vol.
1984).
96. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -23 (Repl. Vol. 1986). See generally J. ULRICH, VIRGINIA
AND WEST VIRGINIA MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS (1985).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(c).
98. The description in this paragraph of the paradigm fact pattern is taken from
McMerit Constr. Co. v. Knightsbridge Dev. Co., 235 Va. 368, 367 S.E.2d 512 (1988), and
United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 357 S.E.2d 509 (1987).
99. 235 Va. 368, 367 S.E.2d 512 (1988).
[Vol. 22:517
1988] CREDITORS' RIGHTS 533
contract stated that all applications for progress payments must be
accompanied by lien waivers. Second, the applications for progress
payments, which the owner supplied, stated that "the CONTRAC-
TOR acknowledges receipt from OWNER of payment of all sums
due," but did not state expressly that the applications were lien
waivers. Third, the applications stated that they would be submit-
ted to the lender and the title insurance company for the purpose
of obtaining progress payments.100 Fourth, the applications pro-
vided to the subcontractors expressly stated that they were lien
waivers.10 1 Fifth, at the time the contractor submitted the applica-
tion, the contractor and the owner disputed the amount owed.102
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment for the owner. The owner argued that the facts showed
an express waiver or that a waiver should be implied. The owner
reasoned that the phrase in the application, "CONTRACTOR ac-
knowledges receipt from OWNER of payment of all sums due,"
must be equated to an express waiver, because a mechanic could
not obtain a lien if no money was owed to it. 0 3 Furthermore, the
only reason to submit the lien waiver to the lender and the title
100. The full text of the document entitled "Contractors Affidavit" provided:
The CONTRACTOR acknowledges receipt from OWNER of payment of all sums due
for work performed, labor and materials furnished or supplied to the date of the pre-
vious advance in connection with the construction of the Project. All subcontractors,
contractors, suppliers, materialmen, laborers and workmen employed or engaged by
the CONTRACTORS on the Project have been paid for all work previously per-
formed for which payment has been made by or on behalf of OWNER, and all sums
due for materials and supplies furnished to CONTRACTOR or for the Project have
been paid for up to and including the period covered by the last preceding advance
It is understood that this Affidavit and Sworn Statement together with attached con-
tractor Application for Payment ... will be delivered by OWNER to TITLE IN-
SURERS for the purpose of obtaining advances of money to or for the benefit of
OWNER.
Id. at 370, 367 S.E.2d at 513 (original emphasis omitted; emphasis added).
101. The form application submitted by subcontractors and materialmen was entitled
"Partial Affidavit, Waiver of Lien and Release." Id. The document provided in pertinent
part:
The undersigned does hereby forever release and discharge the Company [Owner],
the Building and the land upon which the Building is located, from any and all causes
of action, suits, debts, liens, damages, claims and demands whatsoever in law or eq-
uity which the undersigned and/or its assigns ever had, now have, or ever will have
against the Company, the Building, and/or the land upon which the Building is lo-
cated, by reason of the delivery of materials and/or the performance of work relating
to the construction of the building.
Id. at 371, 367 S.E.2d at 513.
102. Id. at 373, 367 S.E.2d at 513-14.
103. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
insurance company was to obtain progress payments. 10 4 The court
responded that the contractor's acknowledgment in the application
may not be treated as an express lien waiver as a matter of law
because the owner was aware that the contractor disputed the
amount owed.105 In addition, had the parties intended to treat the
applications as a waiver, they would have said so expressly, as had
been done in the subcontractor's applications. Also, it was not con-
clusive that the application was to be submitted to the title com-
pany. Such submission could have served the purpose of having
the money released by the lender to be used for progress payments
and not other matters.10 6
The key issue according to the court was whether the contractor
impliedly waived its lien rights. The court indicated that an im-
plied waiver must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.107 Such a rule rests on two assumptions. First, one ordina-
rily does not give up a valuable right granted by statute, and
second, ambiguities of meaning are resolved against the party for
whose benefit the clause was inserted.108 Having stated these prin-
ciples the court simply pointed to the trial judge's characteriza-
tions of the application which demonstrated, to the courts satisfac-
tion, that the clear and convincing evidence test had not been
satisfied.'09 On remand, the contractor appears entitled to sum-
mary judgment.
While one could quibble with the court's rationale for overturn-
104. Id. at 372-75, 367 S.E.2d at 515.
105. Id.
106. The title company has the right to know this. Cf. Southwood Builders, Inc. v. Peer-
less Ins. Co., 235 Va. 164, 366 S.E.2d 104 (1988) (general contractor's early payments to
subcontractor discharged subcontractor's surety on payment bond; payments reduced sub-
contractor's incentive to complete job to injury of surety and payment might not be used for
purposes intended).
107. McMerit Constr. Co., 235 Va. at 374, 367 S.E.2d at 515-16. The court relied on
VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 215 Va. 366, 371, 209 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1974).
In VNB Mortgage, the court apparently limited this strict rule to subcontractor's and mate-
rialmen. McMerit extends the rule to general contractors.
108. See id. at 374, 367 S.E.2d at 515-16.
109. In the instant case, the trial court said this about the contractor's affidavit:
Given to a lawyer, he would tear his hair out and say, client, I'm going to save you
some money and litigation. We're going to put in here this is a release of liens, but
[it will] still get by. It bumps the channel in the bottom but it goes up the river.
The trial court's own language demonstrates, and we agree, that Knightsbridge
[Owner] failed to establish an implied waiver of liens by clear and convincing
evidence.
Id. at 374-75, 367 S.E.2d at 516.
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ing the trial judge as to the existence of a waiver, 110 it is difficult to
quarrel with the court's desire to create "a bright line rule for lien
waivers""' in order to avoid litigation. The decision plainly in-
forms attorneys planning similar transactions to draft clearly.
When a document is intended as a lien waiver, the attorney should
state it is a "waiver of liens." If the owner had done this in
McMerit, the court would have held for the owner. 2 Otherwise,
the owner apparently loses.
There remains some question whether the clear and convincing
evidence test creates a sufficiently bright line. Treating the issue as
one of fact, even with an increased burden of proof, still leaves
opportunity for line blurring. Read properly, McMerit says that
the owner loses if there is any real doubt about whether the con-
tractor waived its lien. This is a sound result, for the owner can
easily comply. One wonders, however, why the court left this mat-
ter open for further litigation." 3
110. The court's treatment of both of the owner's arguments is troublesome. If anything
short of a document entitled or stating "Express waiver of liens" amounts to an express
waiver, the application submitted by the contractor is it. The prime contract required the
contractor to give a lien waiver if it sought progress payments. The application says that the
contractor has been paid in full for the times specified. See supra note 99.
In this constantly recurring situation, what else can this application be if not a lien
waiver? The court relies on the admitted dispute between the parties as to the amount
owed. How does the dispute bear on the question of whether the application was an express
waiver? The dispute indicates that either the contractor was mistaken as to the effect of the
application or that the contractor settled for early payment and subsequently changed its
mind. Possibly the contractor submitted the application with an intent similar to one who
accepts a check but reserves the right to dispute satisfaction later. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-
207 (Repl. Vol. 1984). However, there is no written evidence of such an intent. The owner
seems to have offered clear and convincing evidence that in this setting this was understood
to be an express waiver.
The court ignores the owner's stated reason for submitting the application to the title
company. See supra text accompanying note 99. The owner sought to obtain advances for
progress payments. The case seems to say that unless an owner uses the words "lien waiver"
or their exact equivalent, there can be no express waiver.
A more difficult question is whether the owner offered clear and convincing evidence of an
implied waiver. The court never comes to grips with the question. The court never refers to
the owner's proof, rather, points to the language of the trial judge to demonstrate that he
was not clearly convinced that the contractor impliedly waived the right to claim a lien. See
supra note 108. The trial judge, however, seems to be dealing with whether the application
amounted to an express waiver, not whether a waiver should be implied. Overall, it is diffi-
cult to imagine stronger proof of an implied wavier than the owner presented in McMerit.
111. McMerit Constr. Co., 235 Va. at 374, 367 S.E.2d at 515-16.
112. See United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 357 S.E.2d 509 (1987)
(on facts similar to McMerit, where the words "express waiver" are used, owner wins).
113. Presumably, the contractor did not ask for summary judgment and for this reason
the court had to remand rather than enter final judgment.
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B. Joinder of Parties in the Mechanic's Suit to Enforce
The Virginia Supreme Court has long required that mechanics
strictly comply with all formal aspects of the Mechanic's Lien Act
as a condition precedent to obtaining an enforceable lien.114 The
smallest deviation from the formal requisites may cost the
mechanic the lien. In Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp.,"5 the
court reemphasized this point.
In Robbins, a subcontractor who had not been paid filed a
mechanic's lien and brought a suit to enforce the lien. The subcon-
tractor named the owner and general contractors as defendants,
but failed to name either the trustees or beneficiaries of a deed of
trust, which had been recorded before the construction started.
The trustees and beneficiaries moved to dismiss the suit to enforce
on the ground that they were necessary parties." 6 The supreme
court agreed.117 Although the statute does not expressly require
that such parties be named as defendants,"" principles of due pro-
cess demand that the trustees and beneficiaries of the deed of trust
be made defendants." 9 The suit to enforce is the only appropriate
place in the mechanic's lien process to challenge the validity of the
lien. Interested parties must have notice of the suit in order to pro-
tect their interests.120
As often happens after reading a Virginia case dealing with
mechanics' liens, the reader would like to ask the court a question
or two. Why may the beneficiaries only protect their interests in
114. The court held:
We believe the correct rule [of construction] deducible from the language and pur-
poses of our statute and the decisions of this court with respect to it is, that there
must be a substantial compliance with the requirement of that portion of the statute
which relates to the creation of the lien; but that the provisions with respect to its
enforcement should be liberally construed.
H.N. Francis & Co. v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 125 Va. 106, 121, 99 S.E. 690, 694 (1919).
115. 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986).
116. Id. at 46, 348 S.E.2d at 224-25.
117. Id. at 46-47, 348 S.E.2d at 226.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
119. Walt Robbins, Inc., 232 Va. at 46-47, 348 S.E.2d at 226.
120. A mechanic's lien takes priority over a deed of trust as to the improvements, but is
junior to a deed of trust to the extent of the. estimated value of the land without improve-
ments filed before the work commences. The sale proceeds may be insufficient to fully pay
both lien creditors. Thus, the beneficiary of the deed of trust must be given the opportunity
to challenge the perfection of the mechanic's lien in order to protect its property interest.




the suit to enforce? A mechanic's lien suit is essentially a proceed-
ing in rem. The sale affects only the interests of those joined in the
proceeding. The buyer at this sale would not obtain good title to
the property because the deed of trust had been recorded. Another
suit would have been necessary to clarify the title.121
The supreme court held in Monk v. Exposition Deepwater Pier
Corp.122 that beneficiaries of an "antecedent" deed of trust dis-
closed by the record are not necessary parties and failure to in-
clude them as defendants does not preclude a sale. To distinguish
Monk, a court should explain why deeds of trust recorded after the
improvement commences are different from deeds of trust on rec-
ord before construction began. A court should explain why the due
process interests of the latter are more significant than those of the
former. The Robbins court does not say why this difference is cru-
cial, and no reason comes to mind. The beneficiaries in both in-
stances have a property interest to protect.123 The court may have
wished to overrule Monk in order to increase the efficiency of the
sale. When all parties of record are joined, the purchaser receives
an unencumbered title and should be willing to pay close to full
price. Whatever the court had in mind, it seems to have changed
the law without admitting it has done so.
Robbins' impact on mechanics needs to be noted. In Robbins,
the subcontractor was precluded from ever obtaining a mechanic's
lien against the property.124 The suit to enforce must be com-
menced within six months from filing of the memorandum of lien
or within sixty days of completion of the project.125 This statutory
period had long run by the time the supreme court overturned the
subcontractor's judgment.126 One might ask why the subcontractor
had not cured this defect by joining the trustees and beneficiaries
earlier. The surprising answer is that such amendments are forbid-
den. Once the statutory period for filing the suit to enforce runs,
121. The concept here is essentially the same as the one the Virginia court recognized in
McEwen. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
122. 111 Va. 121, 68 S.E. 280 (1910).
123. The creditors in Robbins and Monk hold liens inferior to the mechanic as to im-
provements, however, the Robbins creditor has priority as to the land while the Monk credi-
tor does not. See supra note 119. This is the only distinction the court offers.
124. Since the subcontractor had no contract with the owner, he can not get a personal
judgment against the owner. His sole remedy is against the general contractor.
125. V&. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
126. Walt Robbins, Inc., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223.
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new defendants may not be added unless they claim through a
party already named.'
Attorneys who represent contractors should not have been sur-
prised by the result in Robbins. Strict compliance is required, even
if the violation does not cause harm.2 8 The mechanic's attorney is
advised to join all parties who could possibly have an interest in
the outcome and some who arguably do not, such as the trustee of
the deed of trust.2 '
V. SECURED CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Impact of Bankruptcy on Foreclosure Proceedings on an In-
dividual Residence
One of the most common reasons a debtor files bankruptcy is
because a creditor has threatened to foreclose a deed of trust on
the debtor's residence. State law offers the debtor no effective way
to halt a foreclosure, however, bankruptcy does. 30 Once the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed, the automatic stay precludes further action
until the creditor can obtain relief from the stay. Bankruptcy of-
fers the debtor a "breathing space," a time to formulate a plan to
save the home. Several recent bankruptcy decisions have clarified
how this matter may be approached.
To take advantage of the bankruptcy alternative, a debtor must
file his petition before the sale is final under non-bankruptcy (Vir-
ginia) law.' 3' The sale is not until all the formalities necessary to
127. Neff v. Garrard, 216 Va. 496, 219 S.E.2d 878 (1975).
128. The beneficiaries of the deed of trust received a windfall through the decision, be-
cause their lien was clearly junior. See supra note 102. Sometimes one has to wonder about
the evenhandedness of the Virginia Supreme Court. Compare Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon
Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986) with J.I. Case Co. v. United Va. Bank, 232 Va. 210,
349 S.E.2d 120 (1986) (creditor permitted to prove no harm in fact, despite egregious viola-
tion of rules designed to prevent harm to defendant in detinue case).
129. The trustee of the deed of trust is also a necessary party because such party must
be divested of legal title if the purchaser at the sale is to obtain good title. This holding
seems to support the idea that the court wishes to increase the efficiency of the process, yet,
the trustee's interest is purely formal. The trustee loses nothing. Why create this additional
snare for the unwary?
130. See generally Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in Chapter 13, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 433 (1984) [hereinafter Zaretsky].
131. The debtor's interest in the property is extinguished if the foreclosure sale has been
completed before the petition is filed. The property is no longer a part of the debtor's estate
and the automatic stay granted by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) does not
prevent creditor action unless the sale process is deficient. See, e.g., Abdelhaq v. Pfiug, 82
Bankr. 807 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
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pass title to the purchaser have been completed. Thus, the sale is
not complete until the trustee of the deed of trust has prepared
and signed the memorandum of sale or has recorded the deed evi-
dencing the sale. As long as the sale is not final, the residence re-
mains a part of the debtor's estate. In effect, filing the bankruptcy
petition permits the debtor to block the sale.132
After the petition is filed, what can the debtor do about saving
the residence? Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code contains no ex-
plicit rehabilitative provisions dealing with real property. Nonethe-
less, the bankruptcy filing may aid the debtor in working out a
reaffirmation agreement with the creditor holding a deed of
trust.133 Of course, the creditor does not have to reaffirm, but often
the creditor will find that the reaffirmation agreement is better
than a sale.
In many cases the debtor's residence is encumbered by two liens,
and the pressure that leads to bankruptcy comes from a junior lie-
nor's efforts to foreclose. The debtor may be able to work out a
reaffirmation agreement with the senior lienor and continue pay-
ments under the senior deed of trust. Yet, this arrangement will be
fruitless for the debtor if such payments inure solely to the benefit
of a junior lienor. For example, suppose the residence is appraised
at $28,000; the first lien secures a $24,000 debt, and the second lien
secures a $16,000 debt. In this situation, each payment reduces the
amount owed to first lienor while increasing the value of the junior
lien.134
In re Crouch1 35 offers the debtor a way out. The debtor was per-
mitted to use section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to "strip
down" the junior lien to the amount available to pay the second
debt, determined as of the date of petition.136 Using the above hy-
pothetical to illustrate the Crouch approach, assume that the resi-
132. See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 75 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) and cases
cited therein.
133. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)(6)(B) and 524(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), except home mort-
gages from the stringent rules concerning reaffirmations. Congress, therefore, must have rec-
ognized that this tactic was common.
134. In the hypothetical, the first lien is a fully secured claim, while the second lien is
partially secured. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In the hypothetical, the
debtor's payment of $1,000 to the first lienor reduces that debt but increases the value of
the second lien on the property by $1,000 (first lien reduced to $23,000, but second lien now
worth $5,000).
135. 80 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987).
136. Id. at 367.
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dence is worth $28,000. The court should "strip down" any lien to
the extent it is not fully secured. Thus, the first lien of $24,000 is
fully secured. The second lien is secured only to the extent of
$4,000. The court should bifurcate the second lien into a $4,000
secured claim and a $12,000 unsecured claim. Section 506(d) voids
the unsecured part of this lien. The court should then order the
trustee to abandon the property and leave the parties to their state
law remedies. 37
In contrast to Chapter 7, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
provides special treatment for home mortgages in section
1322(b)(2). The debtor may cure defaults over the course of his
plan while making regular payments."8 Chapter 13 could be com-
paratively expensive if the debtor has to pay the trustee's commis-
sion of 10% on these payments. Some courts have held that a
Chapter 13 debtor must pay the commission to the trustee on
mortgage payments.139 A recent Virginia bankruptcy decision14 0
holds that payments to satisfy liens on a residence may be made
outside the plan and are not subject to the trustee's commission.'
Of course, the debtor may use the Crouch technique to "strip
down" liens in a Chapter 13 action.
B. United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
An article on recent developments in creditors' rights would be
incomplete without noting the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd.'42 Much ink, both by judges and scholars, has
been consumed dealing with the issue Timbers raises.'43 Much
137. In effect, Crouch, permits the debtor to redeem the residence. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 722
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (permits a debtor to redeem personal property by paying its value
to the secured creditor). Some courts refuse to employ 11 U.S.C. § 506(d), as a method to
redeem real property, as the Crouch court did. Other courts view 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) as a
method to foster a debtor's fresh start and void the entire second lien. Neither of these
extremes seem appropriate. The matter is fully discussed in Note, Can A Debtor Avoid A
Real Property Lien that Exceeds the Value of the Collateral: An Interpretation of Section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. - (1988).
138. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1302.06-.09 (15th ed. 1986); Zaretsky,
supra note 129.
139. See, e.g., Foster v. Heitkamp, 670 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1982).
140. In re Wright, 82 Bankr. 422 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988).
141. Wright grants the trustee a commission on payments to secured creditors for debts
paid in full under the plan. Id. at 424.
142. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
143. The leading article is Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and
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more will be used in debating the result. Only an effort to give the
reader a speaking acquaintance with Timbers will be attempted
here.
Timbers holds that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to
compensation for the delay of its right to foreclose on its collateral
caused by the automatic stay.144 The Timbers rule governs a com-
mon occurrence. Assume that a creditor loans a debtor $2,000,000.
The creditor takes a mortgage on real property worth $1,500,000 as
security for the loan. The creditor is undersecured. Outside bank-
ruptcy, the creditor could foreclose upon default, sell the property
and reinvest the $1,500,000. In bankruptcy, the automatic stay pre-
cludes the creditor's foreclosure. The creditor must file a complaint
for relief from or modification of the stay. Before Timbers, the
creditor would seek either the return of the property or "adequate
protection" of her interest in the collateral via monthly payments
equal to her lost opportunity costs, that is the prospective return
from reinvestment of the liquidation value of the collateral.
The Supreme Court denied the creditor's relief in Timbers,
resolving a conflict among the circuits. 45 Based on its "holistic' 46
reading of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court unanimously concluded
that the undersecured creditor's state law right to immediate fore-
closure was not protected under the concept of "adequate protec-
tion." Therefore, the creditor was not entitled to interest payments
on the value of the collateral. 47 Rather, the creditor was entitled
to be protected only against a decline in the value of its collateral,
and where the collateral was not declining in value, no payments
the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
144. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635.
145. Grundy Nat'1 Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985), and
Crocker Natl Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) were
overruled. The Court affirmed the en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States
Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987).
146. 108 S. Ct. at 630-31. The primary issue in Timbers was the proper construction of
the phrase "interest in property" in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The undersecured creditor argued
that the state law right to foreclose was an interest in property and was entitled to adequate
protection. 108 S. Ct. at 630. The Court responded that the creditor's position was plausible
only if 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) was read in isolation. Id. at 630. "Statutory construction, how-
ever, is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clari-
fied by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used else-
where in a context that makes its meaning clear ..... Id. at 630. The Court asserted that
reading the related sections of the Bankruptcy Code compelled rejection of the creditor's
position. Id. at 630-32.
147. Id. at 635.
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need be made." 8 Such a result, the Court asserted, was necessary
to properly balance the interests of secured and general
creditors. 149
The impact of Timbers upon undersecured creditors is apparent.
Before Timbers, the undersecured creditor had a strong bargaining
position against the reorganizing debtor. If the debtor in posses-
sion desired to use the creditor's collateral, the debtor had to pay
for this right. Under Timbers, the debtor may retain the collateral
without payments if it is necessary to the debtor's reorganization.
According to the Court, the undersecured creditor's position has
not been greatly eroded. Once the undersecured creditor proves its
status, the debtor must demonstrate that there exists "a reasona-
ble possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable
time."'150 If no such prospect exists, the collateral must be released
to the secured creditor.' 51 Secured creditors, on the other hand,
probably view Timbers as further evidence of the demise of secur-
ity interests.
VI. RECENT LEGISLATION
A. Domestication of Foreign Judgments
In 1988, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Foreign Judgments Act).'52
The Foreign Judgments Act represents a major change. Before the
adoption of the Foreign Judgments Act, a foreign judgment had to
be converted ("domesticated") 53 into a Virginia judgment. This
process involved two steps:
148. Id. at 629-30.
149. Id. A detailed account of the Court's rationale is beyond the scope of this article.
150. Id. at 632 (citing United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1987)).
151. "The cases are numerous in which § 362(d)(2) relief has been provided within less
than a year from the filing of the bankruptcy petition." 108 S. Ct. at 632. For this reason
undersecured creditors' fear of "inordinate or extortionate" delay are unfounded. Id.
152. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.1 to -465.5 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
153. Judgments of sister states ... have no force in effect as judgments outside of the
territorial limits of the states . . .in which they are rendered, and, consequently,
cannot be docketed and do not constitute liens in another jurisdiction where the land
is situated. They may be the foundation of actions upon which judgments may be
rendered, and full faith and credit will be given to the records of sister states of the
Union as provided by the Constitution, but that does not mean that they constitute
liens outside of the state in which they are rendered, or can be enforced by execution




First, the judgment creditor must obtain an authenticated copy of
the foreign judgment, and the authentication must comply with the
requirements of the Virginia Statute with respect to the admission
in evidence of the records of the courts of foreign countries or sister
states; and second, the judgment creditor must institute an action
by motion for judgment or other proceedings appropriate to the case
based upon the foreign judgment and obtain service of process on
the judgment debtor in accordance with Virginia Law.'"
This method was not only time consuming and expensive, but also
unsatisfactory, for it failed to give the judgment debt priority over
subsequently obtained local claims.
The Foreign Judgments Act adopts in substance the practice
employed by the federal courts. The Act provides a comparatively
speedy and economical method of enforcing out-of-state judg-
ments.155 The major changes from prior procedure may be summa-
rized as follows:
i. Once a foreign judgment has been filed in the clerk's office, it
must be treated and enforced in the same manner as a Virginia
judgment;156
ii. The creditor must give the clerk an affidavit setting forth
the last known address of the debtor. The clerk is obligated to
promptly notify the debtor that the foreign judgment has been
filed; 57
iii. Enforcement of the foreign judgment may be stayed only by
proof that an appeal is pending in the foreign state, or proof of any
ground for staying enforcement of a Virginia (domestic)
judgment. 158
iv. The traditional method of enforcing a foreign judgment may
be used rather than proceeding under the Foreign Judgments
Act.159
BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 351 (4th ed. 1952).
154. BOYD, GRAVES, supra note 2, at § 12.6.
155. UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. 150
(1964). The treatment of federal judgments in Virginia is described well by RENDLEMAN,
supra note 2, § 8.7.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.2 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
157. Id.
158. Id. §§ 55-66.3, -66.7.
159. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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Once the foreign judgment is filed, the creditor may employ all
remedies available to a Virginia creditor to satisfy her claim, e.g.,
levy execution, garnish the debtor's debtor, and docket and enforce
her judgment lien.160 Thus, the creditor will be able to retain the
relative priority of the claim.
B. Lis Pendens
The filing of a lis pendens gives constructive notice to the world
that title to the described property is the subject matter of a law-
suit. One who acquires an interest in such property from a party-
litigant, while the suit is pending, takes the property subject to the
outcome of the lawsuit. Technically, a lis pendens creates no lien,
but the effect is essentially the same since the property is tied up
until the pending litigation is resolved."'
Most Virginia attorneys have long assumed that a lis pendens
may only be filed in connection with a suit in which title to prop-
erty is at issue. This assumption is questioned in dictum found in
In re Hart.6 2 In Hart, Judge Bostetter upheld the validity of an
attachment, suggesting that a lis pendens could be filed against
real property in connection with an ordinary law suit seeking a
money judgment. 6 ' Lis pendens would be proper because the
plaintiff might obtain a judgment lien on the defendants interest
in real property.6 Thus, "any suit in which the defendant is an
individual has the potential to affect the title to real estate." '65 In
a subsequent case, Green Hill Corp. v. Kim,""6 a divided Fourth
Circuit affirmed a Judge Bostetter decision, holding that a lis
pendens could not be filed in Virginia except in connection with a
suit which brought the title to the property in question. 6 7
160. Virginia courts are not bound by decrees in divorce cases, especially those involving
child custody and support. Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974). See
generally BRINIG & WHITE, VIRGINIA DoMEsTIc RELATIONS HANDBOOK §§ 21-20 to -30 (1985).
Virginia courts are not bound by an out-of-state judgment concerning Virginia real estate.
See Annotation, Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Effect, in State Where Real Property
is Located, of Foreign Decree Dealing with Such Property, 32 A.L.R.3d 1330 (1970).
161. Preston's Drive Inn Restaurant, Inc. v. Convery, 207 Va. 1013, 1016, 154 S.E.2d 160,
162 (1967).
162. 24 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
163. Id. at 824.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 842 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 744; see also Palmore, Commercial Law, C.L.E. Seminar 11-30, 31 (1988).
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The Hart decision and the existence of Judge Hall's dissent in
Green Hill convinced the legislature of the need to clarify this
matter. Thus, section 8.01-268(B) of the Code of Virginia was
amended to state: "No memorandum of lis pendens shall be filed
unless the action on which the lis pendens is based seeks to estab-
lish an interest by the filing party in the real property described in
the Memorandum."' '16 s
One may fie a ]is pendens against real property as an incident of
an attachment even though the attaching party does not claim an
interest in the property. In fact, section 8.01-268 expressly autho-
rizes" such a filing in attachment to suit, permitting the attaching
creditor to protect against sales to a bona fide purchaser during the
litigation.170 Unlike a pure lis pendens, a creditor may obtain an
attachment only if he or she proves the required grounds.1 71 If the
attachment fails for any reason, the creditor is automatically liable
for wrongful attachment. 7 2
C. Other Legislative Changes
Section 8.01-66.2 of the Code of Virginia grants a lien in favor of
hospitals and medical personnel on the claim the injured party has
against the person who caused the injury.17 3 In 1988 the legislature
increased the lien from $500 to $1500 for hospitals and from $100
to $300 for medical personnel." 4
Owner of hangers who service and store aircraft are granted stat-
utory liens pursuant to sections 43-32 and 43-33 of the Code of
Virginia. 17 5
Creditors whose liens have been paid have a duty to record the
release of such liens quickly. Section 55-66.3 of the Code of Vir-
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-268(B) (Cum. Supp. 1988). A lis pendens may be filed against
personal property under § 8.01-268. Whether such a filing in an ordinary lawsuit violates the
statute is unclear.
169. Section 8.01-268 speaks of "lis pendens or attachment."
170. Id. § 8.01-268; see Breeden v. Peale, 106 Va. 39, 55 S.E. 2 (1906).
171. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-534 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see generally RENDLEMAN, supra
note 2, § 1.2.
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-568 (Repl. VoL 1984).
173. Id. § 8.01-66.2 (Cum. Supp. 1988). An injured party's assignment of his negligence
claim to the hospital has been upheld even though causes of action for personal injury may
neither be transferred or levied upon. See In re Duty, 78 Bankr. 111 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987)
(assignment void to extent it involved attorney's fees for collection); see also supra note 62.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2.
175. Id. § 55-66.3 (must record within 90 days).
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ginia puts pressure on the lienors to act quickly through imposition
of costs. A release in the margin, if customarily employed, is
sufficient. 176
176. Id. §§ 55-66.3, -.7 (a marginal release shall be all that is required for a release if
such a release is customarily employed in the clerk's office).
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